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in﻿Italy﻿and﻿Slovakia1
Jana Plichtová, Dino Costantini, Magda Petrjánošová
Abstract: In this paper we analyse how Italy and Slovakia have dealt in practice 
with the idea of religious pluralism and what legal instruments they have used 
to ensure it. The history of state-church relationships in Slovakia has been full of 
abrupt changes due to political changes; in Italy the development has been more 
straightforward, but in both countries the Catholic Church has had a privileged 
position. We offer a few suggestions for how today’s increasing religious plurality 
might be handled in a more transparent and just way, using a rather different legal 
and institutional framework and thus promoting real religious pluralism.
Keywords: religious pluralism, state-church relationship, Slovakia, Italy
1.﻿ Introduction
Europe is becoming a more and more multicultural society. The peaceful coexist-
ence of the different cultures present on its territory is clearly linked to the capabil-
ity of European states to provide the conditions for equal economic, social, political 
and symbolic treatment of all minorities. In this sense, an important corollary of its 
increasing plurality is the fact that the European society is also becoming more and 
more multi-religious. Thus, the equal treatment of religious groups appears to be a 
fundamental social and political challenge of today’s Europe. But are the European 
states ready to take it on? And, in particular, do those states that are traditionally 
mono-religious and without a long history of immigration have the institutional 
sensitivity necessary to tackle such issues?
In comparing the Italian and the Slovak cases, we will examine two countries 
of deeply Catholic tradition, with a short history of immigration2 or none at all. 
Though the principles of religious liberty and plurality are constitutionally recog-
nized in both countries, in both countries Christianity is considered to be one of the 
pillars of national identity. This fact has direct consequences for the institutional 
1 The work on this article was done under the project contract “Exploring the Foundations of a 
Shared European Pluralistic Ethos. A comparative investigation of religious and secular ethical 
values in an enlarging Europe – EuroEthos”, project No. 028522 funded by the 6th Framework 
Programme of the European Commission.
2 After having been a country of emigration for a century, Italy has only recently started to attract a 
consistent number of immigrants; Slovakia is still waiting for the phenomenon to begin on a large 
scale.
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frameworks adopted to regulate relations with religious groups. In Italy, the Con-
stitutional Court clearly affirmed the general principle of laicità as a fundamental 
cornerstone of the Italian Republic, defining it not as a strict separation regime, as 
it is in the well-known case of France, but as an active role of the state in promot-
ing and guaranteeing religious liberty and plurality.3 The Preamble of the Slovak 
Constitution goes beyond this, defining the Slovak nation as “the spiritual heritage 
of Cyril and Methodius”, the missioners who brought Christianity to the territory in 
the 9th century.4 In Italy, the practical aspects of the relationship between the state 
and the various churches and religious groups are regulated by special bilateral leg-
islations: the Concordato, for the very peculiar case of the Roman Catholic Church, 
and the Intese, agreements signed with representatives of other faithss. A similar 
situation exists in Slovakia, with the Basic Treaty regulating the relationship with 
the Holy See, and the Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Registered 
Churches and Religious Societies dealing with all other beliefs.
We will first compare the contrasting geneses of these legal instruments. Sec-
ondly, we will provide a brief presentation of how they practically play out regard-
ing equal treatment of different groups. Finally we will try to answer the question 
whether the present institutional frameworks are apt to serve the needs of the in-
creasing religious plurality of today’s societies or whether this plurality might be 
better tackled through different instruments.
2.﻿ ﻿Historical﻿Note﻿on﻿the﻿Development﻿of﻿State-Church﻿Relations﻿
in﻿Italy
From the Separation to the Concordat
One may say that the history of Italy as a modern nation-state begins on Sep-
tember 20, 1870, when Italian troops entered Rome, thus putting an end to the 
temporal power of the Catholic Church. This violent baptism brought a strict, and 
in many ways hostile, separation in relations between the new born Italian state 
and the Church, with the latter representing the great majority of Italy’s nationals 
3 See Constitutional Court, Sentence n. 203/1989, posing laicità as a “superior principle” of the 
Italian constitutional system. Other relevant sentences are n. 13/1991, n. 149/1995, n. 334/1996, 
n. 329/1997, n. 508/2000, n. 327/2002. On the active or positive concept of laicità in the Italian 
institutional framework, see S. Lariccia, La laicità delle istituzioni repubblicane italiane, in “De-
mocrazia e diritto”, n. 2/2006, pp. 89–110. 
4 The missionaries were sent to Great Moravia (western part of present-day Slovakia was part of it) 
by Michal III, emperor of the Byzantine Empire, on the request of the Moravian ruler Mojmír in 
863. To facilitate the diffusion of Christianity among Slavs the missioners created the first Slavic 
alphabet – the Glagolitic alphabet (later Cyrilic) and translated liturgical texts into the Old Church 
Slavonic language which was then recognized by Pope Hadrian II (868) as the fourth liturgical 
language. In 894, when the last king of Great Moravia Svätopluk died, the empire was dissolved 
and in the liturgy Old Church Slavonic was replaced by Latin.
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at the time. The new state was unilaterally regulated through the so called Legge 
delle guarentigie (May 13th 1871). The law gave the Pope a personal legal status 
similar to that of the Italian King and provided the Church with full diplomatic pre-
rogatives, an annual revenue and a solid independence both in organizational and 
in spiritual matters. No territorial sovereignty of the Church was recognized, as the 
immunity of Vatican Palaces was just liberally conceded by the Italian State. The 
Italian State considered this solution as adequate to guarantee both its own recently 
acquired territorial and political sovereignty and the spiritual independence of the 
Church, as the motto “a free Church in a free State” expresses clearly. The inten-
tions of Italian legislators were harshly contrasted by Catholic hierarchies, which 
refused the legitimacy of the Italian regime, excommunicated its representatives, 
and prohibited believers from taking active part in the political life of the country 
until 1913.
A first and still partially effective restructuring of this initial separation occurred 
during the fascist regime. The school system reform of 1923 (the so called Gen-
tile Reform), gave a great place to Catholic faith in primary education, making it 
compulsory and placing it together as its “fundament” and “crowning piece”. The 
preference given to Catholic faith was a sign of fascist interest towards its nation-
alization, c’est-à-dire towards its mobilization as a means of building consensus 
for the regime itself. On the side of the Catholic Church, fascism – and not only 
the Italian variant5 – was perceived as a possible important ally in the international 
struggle against the spread of modernity6 and of its most redoubtable by-product, 
atheistic communism. The result of this convergence of interests were the Lateran 
Pacts, signed on February 11, 1929. The Pacts profoundly modified the post unitary 
separation regime, recognizing Roman Catholicism as the only religion of the State, 
as stated in Article 1. The implications of the new confessional form taken by the 
State touched a wide range of issues, giving the Catholic Church substantial privi-
leges.7 At the same time, the State obtained a strengthened link between the Church 
5 This is well documented by the Concordats signed with Austria and Germany (1933), Portugal 
(1940) and Spain (1953). See Cardia 2002. The Slovak case is presented hereafter.
6 The most notable anti-modern manifesto produced by the Catholic Church is the Syllabus com-
plectens praecipuos nostrae aetatis errores, an annex to the encyclical Quanta cura (1864). The 
idea of an equal respect due to all religions (proposition XV to XIX) was considered an error, as 
that of the independence of the State from religious power (proposition XXXIX). Catholic Church 
did not definitively abandon Syllabus’ anti-liberal positions until 1965.
7 Article 34 of the Concordat gave civil validity to Catholic weddings, granting the Church full 
judicial powers in eventual controversies; article 36 extended compulsory teaching of Catholic 
religion to secondary schools; article 3 provided religious personnel privileges in relation to the 
military service; etc. The confessional turn affected the Penal Code too, and in particular its Arti-
cles 402–406 and 724: a religious oath was introduced as well as a crime of blasphemy. The code 
created a crime of “public defamation of religion” that provided for stronger measures in case the 
offences were committed against the Catholic religion (see Cardia 1996).
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and the national army, gained political control over the nomination of bishops and 
priests, and forbade direct political engagement by all religious personnel.
The Concordat profoundly undermined the principle of equality of all religions, 
creating a two level system with Catholicism as the privileged state religion on 
one side and all other faiths perceived as tolerated presences on the other. The 
discipline of the “admitted groups” was regulated by Law 1159 of June 29, 1929, 
a law, as we’ll see hereafter, which still has perverse effects on religious freedom 
and equality in Italy (Leziroli 2004). In the following years, religious freedom was 
severely restricted in practice. Before the approval of the well-known racial laws 
that struck Jewish communities in 1938, the Buffarini-Guidi Circular had already 
banned the Pentecostal Church for being “contrary to social order” and “harmful 
for the physical and psychological integrity of the race”.8 In 1939, it was the Je-
hovah’s Witnesses’ turn to be declared illegal and in 1940, the same fate befell the 
Holy Bible Students’ Association.
The Republican Transition
In 1946, the authors of the Italian Republican Constitution inherited from the fas-
cist regime a country where religious liberty was highly compromised. The effort to 
rebuild its legal preconditions had to confront the societal and political necessities 
of national reconstruction that advised against contesting the Lateran Pacts and 
reopening the Roman Question. This was not only for reasons of practical opportu-
nity. A return to the separation regime would not have been fit for a republic whose 
strong social profile recognizes and guarantees the “inviolable rights of the person” 
not only “as an individual” but also “in the social groups where human personal-
ity is expressed” (Art. 2). At the same time, the State took on not only a duty to 
formally respect liberty and equality, but also a duty to concretely “remove those 
obstacles of an economic or social nature which constrain the freedom and equality 
of citizens, thereby impeding the full development of the human person” (Art. 3).
Though the Republican Constitution provides for ample guarantees for the indi-
vidual (Arts. 2 and 3) as well as for religious (Arts. 8, 19 and 20) liberty and equal-
ity, the separation regime was not re-established, both for theoretical and practical 
reasons. After stating that “the State and the Catholic Church are independent and 
sovereign, each within its own sphere”, Article 7 provides for their relations to be 
governed by the Lateran Pacts. The possible contrast between the principle of equal 
freedom of all religions and the special place that Article 7 left to the Catholic 
Church in the very heart of the constitution was clearly perceived by the founding 
8 Ministry of Interior, Circular 600/158 of April 9, 1935. The persecution of Pentecostals survived 
the death of the fascist state, to end only in 1958.
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fathers of the Italian republic. The imagined solution to the problem of equality 
of treatment was built upon the bilateral character of the Lateran Pacts. The idea, 
expressed through article 8, was that the Republic had to extend the instrument of 
the agreements to the relationship between the state and all non-catholic groups: the 
spreading of bilateral agreements would have thus given to all religions the same 
dignity and privileges enjoyed by the Catholics.9
The particular influence of the Catholic Church on Italian political and social 
life retarded consistently the process of this progressive extension of constitutional 
protection to religious groups other than Catholicism. On the contrary, a sort of 
neo-confessional10 mood suggested during the 1950s a theistic (Cardia 1996: p.172) 
interpretation of the constitution, which, having strong political and societal sup-
port, enabled a delay in the application of constitutional principles until the 1980s 
(Cardia 1980, 2002; Lariccia 1981).
The Reform of the Concordat of 1984: Putting Article 8 into Practice
The necessity of a reform gained momentum in the public sphere during the 
late 1960s. A first proposal of reform was discussed by the parliament in 1967. 
In 1968, a study Commission (the Gonnella Commission) was formed that led to 
no result. In the meantime the contradiction between the progressive secularisa-
tion of society and the old-fashioned confessionalism of the Concordat became 
more and more evident. The Concordat, for example, left only to the Church the 
power to dissolve marriages according to its complicated casuistry. The Fortuna-
Baslini Law11 introduced for the first time a limited possibility of civil divorce. The 
Catholic Democratic Party organised an abrogative referendum in 1974. The defeat 
of the anti-divorce party showed clearly that Italian society was moving towards 
secularization faster than the norm.
In 1976, the Catholic Church and the state agreed to open real negotiations. Six 
drafts were produced, until an agreement was reached on February, 18, 1984. The 
revised Concordat abolished Article 1 of the Lateran Tract that established Ca-
tholicism as the official state religion. However, the new Concordat substantially 
confirmed the privileged institutional position of the Catholic Church. For exam-
ple, while abolishing compulsory religion classes in Italian primary and secondary 
schools, it extended its facultative teaching to nursery schools. These teachers are 
chosen and can be fired by the Church – in cases of moral conduct contradicting 
Catholic principles. For example, they can be fired if they get married in a civil 
procedure, or if they chose to live together with someone without getting married, 
9 Cfr. Art. 8, comma 2 and 3.
10 Cfr. Cassazione, Sentence 2651, of October 23, 1964.
11 Law 898 of December 1, 1970.
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or if they give born to a baby out of wedlock but the cost is covered by the Italian 
State.12
Another example comes from the new financing system introduced by the re-
vised Concordat. The new system, based on a voluntary contribution by taxpay-
ers of 8/1000 of their payable personal income taxes, is apparently respectful of 
individual religious preferences. The procedure for distribution of the funds how-
ever, leaves a substantial privilege to the Catholic Church. Even if only 35 % of 
the taxpayers indicate the Catholic Church as their chosen recipient, 89 % of the 
funds collected is given to the Italian Episcopal Conference, for a total amount of 
one billion Euros per year.13 In addition, the Catholic Church is publicly funded 
through many other indirect instruments: funding of confessional schools14 and 
universities, regional conventions on religious assistance in hospitals, fiscal ex-
emptions on estate taxes, etc.
Regardless of its limits, the revision of the Concordat was an occasion to start 
putting constitutional principles into practice. The beginning of the negotiations 
with the Vatican coincides with the opening of parallel negotiations with other 
groups for the production of the bilateral agreements (Intese) provided for by the 
constitution, but never realized before. Three days after the reform of the Concordat 
the first agreement was signed with the Waldenses Community. In subsequent years 
several other agreements were signed, in particular with the Assemblies of God in 
Italy, the Union of Seventh-day Adventist Churches, the Union of Jewish Com-
munities in Italy, the Christian Evangelic Baptist Union and the Lutheran Evangelic 
Church in Italy.
On April 4, 2007 the Italian government modified its agreements with the Wal-
denses and the Seventh-day Adventists and signed new agreements with the Ap-
ostolic Church in Italy, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Holy 
Archdiocese and Exarchate of Southern Europe, the Buddhist Italian Union, the 
Hinduist Italian Union and the Jehovah’s Witnesses. These agreements still require 
laws to become effective.15
12 In 2001, 25,000 teachers, for a cost of 620,000,000€. The data comes from the UAAR website 
(http://www.uaar.it), which contains useful information on this subject.
13 Data UAAR 2003, relative to fiscal year 2002.
14 Public funding of parochial schools, the great majority being Catholic, has been progressively 
increased, especially after the approval of Law 62/2000, integrating private schools as part of the 
national educational system. In 2005, the total public contribution to private schools amounted to 
500 million Euros (see Ministry of Education, Circular n. 38 of March 22, 2005). This contradicts 
Art. 33 of the Italian Constitution that permits the existence of private schools, but “at no cost to 
the state”.
15 On April 18, 2001 Italy opened a procedure – which still has not been completed – in order to 
reach an agreement with the Italian Buddhist Institute Soka Gakkai. A complete and more detailed 
list can be found here: http://www.governo.it/Presidenza/USRI/confessioni/intese_indice.html.
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3.﻿ ﻿Historical﻿Note﻿on﻿the﻿Development﻿of﻿State-Church﻿Relations﻿
in﻿Slovakia
Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938)
After the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as one of the successor 
states, the Czechoslovak Republic had a chance for new state-church relations.16 
The new republic’s draft constitution even included separation of state and church, 
but finally the parliament supported the principle of sovereignty of the state over 
churches and religious communities (Constitution Charter, § 123). The state took 
the role of guaranteeing the equality of religious faiths, but also the right to inter-
vene in the internal affairs of churches (through the formulation of norms for the 
future management of the internal affairs of churches).
In addition, Czechoslovakia was bound by the Saint-Germain Agreement (1919) 
to guarantee freedom of religion to all citizens irrespective of their ethnicity, 
language or church affinity. In education the state was inspired by the French 
concept of a neutral state (laicité) – education must not contradict the results of 
scientific research, but there were religion classes at schools (Constitution Charter, 
§ 119). Also, the rights of minority churches were protected by the constitution, 
in the same way as the rights of ethnic and racial (in the language of the period) 
minorities.
In political life the principle of neutrality and cooperation between the state and 
the churches worked quite well, except for a few cases. Firstly, there were the po-
litical activities of clerics in Slovakia who actively participated in politics (maybe 
because of the lack of intelligentsia in general) and used their sermons for politi-
cal goals (see Bušek 1931). Secondly, there was an attempt (supported by politi-
cians) to found a new religious tradition which would compete with Catholicism. 
This role was supposed to be played by the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren 
(formed in 1918 through the unification of the Protestant churches of the Lutheran 
and Reformed confessions) and by the Czechoslovak Hussite Church (which sepa-
rated from the Roman Catholic Church in 1920). The Hussite Church drew on the 
general popularity of Jan Hus and Hussite reformers in the Czech lands and in 1921 
had already over half a million members. Later, it even had more than one million 
members, but it never really succeeded in threatening the dominant position of the 
Roman Catholic Church.
Some years later (1927/28), a Modus Vivendi agreement was signed between 
the Holy See and the Czechoslovak Republic. The Holy See was bound to let 
16 The Habsburgs’ policy of political and cultural allegiance with the Catholic Church had utilised 
Catholicism as a source of common identity for the multinational state and as protection against 
both national movements and liberalism (Evans, 1979).
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the Czechoslovak government assess the political acceptability of new church dig-
nitaries before appointing them and interestingly, Czechoslovakia was NOT bound 
to guarantee religion classes in schools or church property. The agreement mainly 
helped to reach congruence between the borders of the dioceses and the borders of 
the new state.
The Slovak State (1939–1945)
A radical shift in the church-state relations came when, after the Munich agree-
ment (1938), the territorial and political integrity of the Czechoslovak state was 
compromised. That is, the Czech and Moravian lands were occupied and thus part of 
the German Reich (1939), and, in accordance with Hitler’s plans, Slovakia became 
an independent state. Jozef Tiso, a Catholic priest and chairman of the Hlinka’s 
Slovak People’s Party (HSĽS), became the new Slovak Prime Minister and later 
President. The ideology of this party – Christian nationalism – conceived nations as 
God’s creations (Tiso 1930/1997). According to it, since religion is above politics, 
a just government has to conform to its dictates. The integration of the church and 
state became the cornerstone of the state ideology and helped to justify its politics 
(Nedelsky 2001). This special relationship could be seen also on a personal level – 
not only the President, but also several other important functionaries and more than 
one fifth of the Slovak Diet (parliament) were priests.
Earlier religious (and political) pluralism was fast replaced by the dominance of 
the Catholic Church, which played an important role in the struggle against ideo-
logical enemies – Communists and Liberals. A strong criticism of the principles 
of liberal democracy and political pluralism can be found in various speeches by 
Slovak representatives (Nedelsky 2001, Lipták 1999). Tiso himself saw in political 
pluralism a danger dividing the nation into fighting fractions (Tiso, 1939/1997). 
Thus, already at the very beginning of the existence of this state, political pluralism 
was eliminated. All political parties (except for the Communist party which was 
abolished) had to join the HSĽS party, which was later designated by the constitu-
tion as the only true national party. The only exceptions were parties representing 
the German and Hungarian minorities.
In the preamble to the new constitution (from July 21, 1939) Slovakia openly 
adhered to the theistic principle – the superiority of God and his will over earthly 
matters. By replacing the sovereignty of the people by that of God, the Slovak 
Constitution denied the basic principle of liberal democracy (Jelinek, 1976). The 
representative leadership was later replaced by an authoritarian elite whose main 
role was to unify the nation, to protect its unity and to govern with a God-given 
legitimacy (Kirschbaum 1940/1997). This authoritarian ideology was objectified 
in Article 58 of the constitution according to which the power of Hlinka’s Slovak 
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People’s Party is delegated to its leader without popular consent. In 1942 the Diet 
(the Assembly) passed a law which established the fascist leader principle accord-
ing to which the party leader had the supreme right to speak for and make decisions 
on behalf of the party and, thereby, also on behalf of the whole nation (Lettrich 
1955). Freedom of thought was of course severely restricted. It was admitted only 
when it was in harmony with conscience and Catholic convictions.
Under the influence of National Socialism of Nazi Germany the official doctrine 
of the state – Christian nationalism – incorporated in its teaching the racist prin-
ciple. Due to this, Slovak nationalism became ethnically-oriented and exclusive 
rather than Christian and inclusive. Persecution of Roma and Jewish minorities 
was very severe, violating all provisions of the Charter of civic and political rights 
(which was part of the Slovak Constitution). Later the parliament passed one of the 
cruellest anti-Jewish laws in Europe (Kamenec 1991/2007) legalizing persecution, 
including deportations of Jews, taking away their Slovak citizenship and confiscat-
ing their property (May 15, 1942). Not one of the priests who were members of 
parliament protested. Throughout the period, the Vatican was very well informed 
and of course knew that the anti-Semitism of the priest Tiso and of several oth-
ers bishops and clerics in the Slovak government as well as the parliament com-
promised the Catholic Church itself. Nevertheless, it did not ask Tiso to renounce 
his presidency or his priesthood. Nor did Vatican cut its diplomatic relations with 
the Slovak State or protest against the human rights violations and limitations of 
religious freedoms for Jews. But it intervened several times to try to help Slovak 
Jews who converted to Catholicism. The efforts of the Vatican intensified during the 
Second World War and finally it demanded respect for human rights of all Jews, not 
only those who had converted (Kamenec et al. 1992). Nevertheless, by the end of 
the war the Slovak State under the Catholic president had deported 70,000 Jews, of 
whom 67,000 died in Nazi extermination camps.
Communist Czechoslovakia (1945–1989)
After the Second World War when Czechoslovakia was unified once again, the 
political situation looked quite different. Collaboration by Hlinka’s Slovak People’s 
Party (and the Catholic Church) with Nazi Germany weakened their position and 
strengthened the leftist parties, including the Communist party, whose many mem-
bers actively participated in the antifascist movement.
After the communist coup d’état in February 1948, the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia (KSČ) was eager to minimize the influence of the Vatican and the 
power of the Catholic church itself and tried to change it into a national church sub-
ordinated to the state and Marxist ideology. First, the Communist party limited po-
litical pluralism and outlawed or neutralized all other political parties. Then, having 
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all the power in parliament it very quickly pushed through several laws that changed 
the position of churches.
First the parliament passed Laws 142/1947 Coll. and 46/1948 Coll. introducing 
a land reform which left the churches without any agricultural grounds, gardens or 
orchards bigger than 5 acres (2 hectares). The laws stipulated financial compensa-
tions, but the churches never got any (Kalný 1995, Kaplan 1995). Then came Law 
95/1948 on the secularisation of schools. Under it, religion classes still existed and 
schools were supposed to organise classes for pupils of different faiths through 
the parishes, but it was all under the auspices of the regional, so-called people’s 
committees (“národný výbor”). This new institutional structure was created by the 
Communist party in order to control daily life in detail, even at the level of small 
village communities (Hrdina 2006).
In general, the communist strategic plan for the struggle against churches was 
based on indirect and gradual steps, because the party understood that it is not sen-
sible to try to eliminate religion openly and directly. The KSČ’s Central Committee 
worked out a plan to dissolve the churches from inside, including discrediting them 
in the eyes of the public, using different interests of the church hierarchy and simple 
clerics, disrupting relationships among different churches by showing preference 
for some and handicapping others. For the majority Catholic Church the plan did 
not foresee a separation of state and church but a separation of the Catholic Church 
from the Vatican, with the idea of using such a church (independent from Rome) in 
the interest of the regime (Hrdina 2006).
The Communist government succeeded in confusing all its critics (from Vatican 
as well as from the group of Slovak bishops) by passing of two laws – the Law no. 
218/1949 Coll. on financing of churches and the Law no. 217/1949 Coll. on the es-
tablishing of the Governmental Office for Religious Affairs. In the first law the state 
transformed the status of priests into that of civil servants/employees of the state. 
The state took responsibility to pay their wages, as well as all administration costs, 
and costs covering religious services, however, only priests who were approved 
by the state got paid, and the state approved only priests who were Czechoslovak 
citizens, loyal to the Communist regime, etc. In this way the priests became directly 
controlled by the state. The second law established an office that had a total control 
over both internal and external affairs of churches (for more details see Hrdina 
2006).
In 1954, the state even officially stopped taking into account personal affilia-
tions to various religions, as they were understood as a completely private matter. 
However, the regional and district committees of the party continued to monitor all 
activities of clerics, and were supposed to stop them from trying to persuade any 
young people to join any churches (Kaplan 1993).
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The constitution of 1960 (Law No. 100/1960 Coll.) proclaimed human rights and 
freedoms, including the freedom of religion, but it also declared Marxism-Len-
inism to be the official ideology of the state. In practice, religious freedoms were 
restricted through various decrees by the government and ministries and through 
court decisions.
Then, in the 1970s, came another step in the effort to compromise the Catholic 
Church – the establishment of the Pacem in terris movement, a union of Catholic 
clergymen collaborating with the Communist regime. At first, not many were inter-
ested, but through oppression and intimidation, some clergymen became members. 
The movement helped the regime to enforce its interests within the Catholic Church 
and also became an unofficial representative of the churches in negotiations with 
the state.
At the end of the 1980s, the churches finally protested against the regime, but 
from a comparative perspective, we can say that the Catholic Church in Slovakia 
recovered very slowly from its disintegration. It began to contest the power of the 
communist regimes much later than the Polish and Lithuanian churches and did 
it less vigorously. In the Czech lands, where the civic resistance against the com-
munist regime was traditionally stronger than in Slovakia (Charta 77), the Catholic 
Church was rather passive. Conversely, it was the Charta 77 movement that de-
manded religious freedom in addition to human rights. Similarly, the movement 
for democracy in Slovenia and Croatia was mainly inspired by non-religious leftist 
intellectuals and nationalists (Plichtová 2008).
After 1989
Immediately after the Velvet Revolution, the political elites discussed the separa-
tion of the church from the state once again, but again the political will to do so 
was lacking for several reasons.17 However, the bill of human rights guaranteeing 
the “right to profess any religious faith or to be without religious conviction, and 
to practice religious acts excluding those that contravene the law” was approved 
unanimously during the first session of the new government. In 1991, the Law 
on the freedom of religious belief and on the position of churches and religious 
communities (no. 308 /1991 Coll., later amended by Law 394/2000 Coll.) and the 
Constitutional Law 460/1992 Coll. provided a legal anchor of for freedom of be-
lief and made possible full restoration of the autonomy of churches and religious 
communities (for details, see Moravčíková 2003). However, in 1992 a new law 
17 It seems it has been tempting to conduct politics using the support of the churches, especi-
ally the Catholic Church. The churches also profit from this silent agreement. Today, they 
are still paid from the taxes of all taxpayers, regardless of whether they claim any religious 
affiliation.
90
The﻿State,﻿Religious﻿Pluralism﻿and﻿its﻿Legal﻿﻿
Instruments﻿in﻿Italy﻿and﻿Slovakia
Jana Plichtová, Dino Costantini, 
Magda Petrjánošová
(no. 192/1992 Coll.) came into force, which limited the possibilities for official 
registration of new churches, when it introduced the requirement of 20,000 adult 
members and supporters.18 Even if state control over affairs of churches and reli-
gious communities was abolished (Law no. 217/1949 Coll.), Law no. 218/1949 
Coll. from the Communist period on financing of churches remained valid in a 
revised form (No.522/1992). According to it, clerics are still paid (like other civil 
servants) from the state budget.
In Czechoslovakia as in other post-communist countries, the traditional Christian 
churches quickly resumed much of their power lost after 1945. They re-established 
their official ties with states (in the case of the Catholic Church, by international 
agreements with the Holy See), they re-entered public schools and revitalized their 
pastoral and charitable activities in hospitals and other social institutions. In Slova-
kia much of their property was returned to them (according to Law no. 282/1993 
Coll. on Restitution of property) and they gained many privileges (for details see 
Moravčíková 2003, Zrinščak 2004).
After the division of Czechoslovakia into the Czech and Slovak Republics in 1993, 
the new Slovak Constitution came into force. According to Article 1, the Slovak Re-
public is not linked to any ideology or religious belief. Religious freedom, however, 
is protected by the detailed Article 24 (freedom of thought, conscience, religion and 
faith, the right to freely express one’s own faith, self-governance of churches and 
religious communities) and the equal status of different religious beliefs is guaran-
teed by Article 12 (basic rights and liberties are guaranteed to everyone regardless 
of sex, race, colour of skin, language, creed and religion, etc.). Article 23 of the 
constitution guarantees the right to religious education and responsibility for that is 
delegated to churches and religious communities.
18 Of the 14 religious groups registered by then, only five could claim 20,000 or more members. 
This contributed to the perception of the law as arbitrary and discriminatory, putting newer 
or smaller religious communities at a disadvantage and perpetuating the existing hierarchy of 
religious organisations. Currently (in 2008), eighteen religious groups are registered and there-
fore eligible for preferential treatment – the Apostolic Church, the Baptist Union, the Breth-
ren Church, the Czechoslovak Hussite Church, the Orthodox Church, the Reformed Christian 
Church, the Old Catholic Church, the Evangelical Church of Augsburg Confession, the United 
Methodist Church, the Greek (Byzantine) Catholic Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the 
Central Union of Jewish Religious Communities, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, the Reli-
gious Society of Jehovah’s Witnesses, the New Apostolic Church, The Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints, the Bahai Community, the Christian Corps (but among these religious 
groups the last five named do not accept any payments from the state for their clerics’ wages 
or for administration, and the Seventh-Day Adventist Church accepts only state money for 
administrative costs). The 20,000 person requirement is the highest numerical threshold for 
registration in any of the 55 member states in the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE). In Slovakia, the registration requirement is especially significant because 
non-registered religious communities are denied legality (and a lot of advantages) as religious 
organisations.
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4.﻿ Problems﻿and﻿Perspectives﻿of﻿Religious﻿Freedom﻿and﻿Equality
In November 2000, Slovakia signed a Basic Treaty between the Slovak Republic 
and the Holy See (hereafter “the Basic Treaty”) regarding the general relationship 
between the state and the Catholic Church (the text is in the collection of Slovak 
laws under Notice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. 326/2001). It should be 
followed by several smaller treaties about specific areas, e.g. conscientious objec-
tion. The treaty details a number of duties incumbent upon the Slovak Republic 
with respect to the Catholic Church, including a number of financial obligations 
and rights held by the Catholic Church primarily in the field of education in general 
and in religious education in particular, in all types of schools, in the establishment 
and administration of its own schools of different stages and in providing space in 
the public service media (for more details, see Kliment 2001).
Two years after the treaty (also known as a Concordat) was signed, the President 
of the Slovak Republic signed an agreement with eleven churches and religious 
communities registered in the Slovak Republic (Law no. 250/2002 Coll.). However, 
the Basic Treaty with the Holy See is treated, according to a government resolution 
(Resolution of the Slovak Government No. 1130 of November 28, 2001), as an 
international agreement on human rights and therefore has precedence over Slo-
vak laws, while the Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Registered 
Churches and Religious Societies ratified in 2002 is only a domestic agreement 
within a traditional contractual framework. Freedom of conscience of those not 
registered is protected by other legal norms adopted later in Parliamentary Act 
365/2004 on equal treatment in specific areas, on protection against discrimination 
and on changes and amendments to several Acts of Law (the Non-Discrimination 
Act) and the new amendment to the Labour Code. Since freedom of religion in 
general was sufficiently protected by the constitution and international documents, 
it seems perfectly legitimate to question the political sense of signing the Basic 
Treaty.
Public discussion and protests were launched only after the ratification of the 
treaty (probably due to the long-standing and unpublicised treaty preparation and 
very fast ratification by the parliament) when the public learned how the treaty 
would change the character of relations between the state and the church in Slova-
kia (Zavacká 2000, 2003).
The situation was completely different when in 2003 the Slovak Republic was 
preparing for the signature of one of the specific treaties with the Vatican – the 
Special Treaty on conscientious objection. There was a major outcry against the 
draft treaty from Slovak and international politicians, organizations and NGOs. 
There were heated discussions in the media between its defenders and critics rang-
ing from lay argumentation to analyses by lawyers and petitions both against and 
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for were organised, etc. Finally, the Special Treaty was not signed and the current 
government (2008) has no intention of doing so.
In Italy, twenty-four years after the revision of the Concordat, the question on the 
table is whether entering into bilateral agreements has brought the desired equal 
treatment of the various faiths present in the country. Such a question must be posed 
keeping in mind that Italian society has profoundly changed since 1948. Whatever 
the intentions of the republican founding fathers might have been, they were con-
fronted with the needs of a different country. In recent years the religious diversity 
of Italian society has drastically increased. Italy is rapidly becoming a multicultural 
country, destined to host an increasing population of non-western origin and var-
ied religious background. According to CESNUR,19 nowadays 1,124,300 Italians 
(1.92% of the population) profess a faith other then Catholicism. This number might 
seem modest, but it increases to 2,663,300 (4.4%) if we count residents instead 
of citizens. CESNUR uses data from a Caritas survey of 2005 (Caritas/Migrantes 
2005). If we confront this data with data from 2007 (Caritas/Migrantes 2007), it is 
easy to appreciate how rapidly Italy is becoming a multi-religious country:
Table 1: Religious Composition of Immigrant Population in Italy
Religious﻿affiliation﻿of﻿
immigrant﻿population
Numerically﻿
(2005)
%
Numerically﻿
(2007)
% Increase﻿
Muslims 919,492 33% 1,202,395 32.6% + 30.8%
Catholics 629,713 22.6% 685,128 18.6% + 8.8%
Orthodox 565,627 20.3% 918,375 24.9% + 62.4%
Protestants (and other 
Christians) 183,898 6.6% 188,254 5.1% + 2.4%
Hindus 66,872 2.4% 99,194 2.7% + 48.3%
Buddhists 52,940 1.9% 67,978 1.8% + 28.4%
Traditional religions 
(“animists”) 33,436 1.2% 41,366 1.1% + 23.7%
Jewish 8,359 0.3% 8,943 0.2% + 6.7%
Others 326,003 11.7% 478,419 13% + 46.8%
TOTAL 2,663,300 100% 3,690,052 100% + 38.6%
19 See <http://www.cesnur.org/religioni_italia/introduzione_01.htm>.
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As the sociology of immigration demonstrates well (Basso – Perocco 2003), the 
great majority of these persons are going to settle in Italy, thus modifying perma-
nently the religious composition of the Italian population. Such a prospect lends 
a particular urgency to the issue of actually implementing constitutional commit-
ments to religious freedom and equality. As instruments, the agreements themselves 
do not seem capable of satisfying this need for several reasons.
The agreements have proved to be very similar in their outcomes, which often have 
a merely symbolic content. When they recognize the right of people to “profess their 
faith, and to practice it freely in any form, individual or associated, to propagate it 
and to exercise its faith in private or in public” – a formula that recurs – they are only 
reaffirming a right that the Italian Constitution already guarantees for all citizens.
Moreover, the proliferation of such “xerox agreements” (Fiorita 2007; Guaz-
zarotti 2007), seems to have worsened the relative position of the religious com-
munities who have not reached an agreement. These are still governed by fascist 
law on admitted groups, and are excluded from many direct and indirect benefits,20 
of which the most important one is obtaining their potential share of the 8/1000 
contribution.
These religious groups’ situation is worsened by the fact that, the complex proce-
dure needed to open an agreement is exposed to political discretionary power both at 
the beginning (only the government has the right to open the consultative procedure) 
and at the end (to enter into force, agreements need to be transposed into laws). 
Any subsequent amendments must follow the same procedure, which can take years 
to be completed. In addition, since the political decision necessary to conclude a 
new agreement and enact it as a law has important economic consequences, lobbies 
close to Catholic Church have created a particularly perverse political obstruction 
to the recognition of the most numerically consistent minorities. This, together 
with a cultural preference for religions institutionally organised according to the 
Church model (i.e. with a professional clergy and a centralized organisation) has 
considerably slowed the process of recognition of many groups, and in particular of 
non-western religions. This way, the agreement system, instead of recognising and 
fostering the integration of religious communities in the state, has become an instru-
ment of unpredictable, discretionary governmental power, which acts as a monopoly 
in the selection of legitimate religious subjects (see Guazzarotti 2002).
Since 1992, a heated discussion has taken place on the necessity of substituting 
Law 1159/1929 with a new framework law on religious freedom (Nardini – di Nucci 
20 This is true not only at a national level. Many regional laws granting funds (especially to build 
religious structures) or fiscal exemptions to religious institutions, limit their benefits to those 
groups that have reached an agreement with the state. The Constitutional Court has declared such 
a limitation unconstitutional (see Constitutional Court, Sentence no. 195/1993; Tozzi 2005).
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2001). Proposed new laws have been presented several times since then, the last be-
ing in 2007, with no concrete result, but the increasing diversity of Italian society 
makes the adoption of such a framework law highly desirable.
Conclusions
Both Italy and Slovakia are secular states with a constitutional system that defines 
their relationships with religious groups as neutral, and thus capable of respecting 
their autonomy and pluralism. This common constitutional commitment not to be 
bound to any religion or ideology does not prevent Italy and Slovakia from sup-
porting the activities of the various recognised religious groups directly (from tax 
income) as well as indirectly (through various tax allowances).
There is no contradiction for a secular state in financing religious groups. Such 
support is part of the role of a state that respects not only the existence of individu-
als, but also the existence of social groups. An effort should be made, however, to 
respect the principle of equal dignity of the different religious groups present in 
the society. Similarly, this should be achieved by distributing evenly the financial 
support that the social role of religious groups implies. This is far from the reality 
in both Slovakia and Italy.
In both countries the Concordat accords to the Catholic Church several privileges 
not accessible to other churches. The laws on registration of churches as well as the 
agreements system used in both countries with an aim to guarantee religious plural-
ism, seems to have strengthened a hierarchical order of religious groups rather than 
encouraging their equality.
In Slovakia, churches which have managed to register or to sign an agreement 
live under very unfavourable economic conditions. The Slovak requirement (for 
registration, see above) of 20 000 adult members, shows the lack of political will to 
create conditions of real religious freedom including newer and smaller religious 
groups. Nonetheless, since state support depends only on fulfilment of the registra-
tion criteria for churches, the procedure is easier and less dependent on political 
power in comparison to Italy.
In both cases however, traditional religions seem to be full of apprehension about 
“newcomers”, with whom they would be obliged to share the financial support 
from the state. This apprehension is often transformed (by political lobbies close to 
the interests of traditional churches) into suspicion-building public discourse – e.g. 
on the so-called sects,21 or on the alleged inability of Islam to share democratic 
values – that often overlap with xenophobic or racist discourse on immigration, 
21 This is what the new religious communities are consequently called, for more details see Tížik, 
2006).
Politics﻿in﻿Central﻿Europe﻿4﻿(December﻿2008)﻿2
95
and help spread the clash of civilisations doctrine. The threat to democratic values 
posed by similar political speculation fosters the need for general reflection on the 
relationship between the state and religious communities which would lead to the 
state being capable of dealing with increasingly multicultural conditions.
Such a reflection cannot be made here, because it broadly exceeds the scope of 
this paper. We can, however, indicate at least three points that a further investigation 
should take into account:
1) Bilateral agreements appear not to be an instrument which is, in itself, suffi-
cient to fulfil the commitment to the protection of religious liberty and equality. The 
obvious reasons for this are the complexity of its approval process, its submission 
to political discretionary power and the rigidity of its often symbolic content. If the 
principle of religious pluralism should be not only proclaimed but also applied, reg-
istration of new religious groups should be liberalised. Furthermore, the increasing 
multicultural structure of our societies suggests the need for a common legislative 
framework, in which the state is bound to support all religious groups in the same 
way (i.e. allocating finances proportionally according to the size of the different 
religious communities).
The bilateral agreement system – and even more evidently the Concordats – ap-
pears outdated. There is no need to abolish it, but there is an absolutely urgent need 
to reconsider its form and contents. At the moment, it contents and structure follows 
the Concordat, which is not an approach mirroring real religious pluralism and 
equality. Agreements should be freed from their tendency to be transformed into 
manifestos, and used carefully only to regulate particularly controversial matters in 
the relations between religious groups and the state.
2) Citizens without a religious faith should be more adequately considered. As 
the international conventions on religious liberty already provide for, the affilia-
tion to a religious group should be strictly voluntary and always retractable. No 
one should be assigned permanently to any religious group, and the possibility 
of leaving a group should be adequately protected. For the same reason, the state 
should not, as is the case now, force (or trick) anyone to participate in the support 
of religious groups they do not intend to belong to. Contributions to the funding 
of religious groups should be strictly voluntary and individual. From this point of 
view, it would be just for the state to finance the churches and nongovernmental 
civic organisations in the same way, by introducing a system of tax income re-
distribution, in which the citizens themselves can decide which church or secular 
humanist organization or cultural/educational institute they want to support with 
their taxes. Such a law would express respect towards all citizens, including those 
without religious affiliation and atheists, whose freedom and decisions should be 
protected exactly in the same way as those of believers.
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3) Religions recognised by the state have the right to offer religion classes in 
primary and secondary schools taught by a person chosen and paid by the respec-
tive church. Furthermore, these religions have the right to establish schools that 
are run by the specific church (mainly the Catholic and, in the Slovak case, the 
Evangelical Church are active), but financed by the state. Given the limits of the 
agreement system, and from the perspective of a neutral state which will have to 
face the increasing religious pluralism of our societies, it would be more appropri-
ate to teach religion studies in schools and to practice (or not practice) a specific 
religion in private.
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